...In the end, Regan’s argument brings up good points. However, there are flaws. Mainly, the line between “subject-of-a-life” and “non-subject-of-a-life” can become blurred depending on the individual.
- I’m reminded of people who strap themselves to trees to prevent logging. Are they wrong by Regan’s definition? (Not bringing into account the multitude of reasons to stop logging.)
Cohen’s reply really interested me, as he uses many of the arguments against logical fallacy that I enjoy.
- He breaks down the nature of Regan’s appeal and examines the logic used.
- Cohen still makes the argument that animals have value – though he places the value more on their rights as individual lifeforms than on the debate of their personal awareness.
- I think this is an interesting take. While it may be equally open to interpretation and debate, it’s a different prospective.
...Cavalieri has her own unique perspective of human rights transferring to animals. This hearkens back to our class discussion of comparing animals rights to slavery/the holocaust.
- For the record, I would sign a petition to give mattresses to holocaust victims. As we saw, they (the victims) weren’t saved overnight. Why not stop the bleeding in the field on the way to the hospital?
I agree with what Cavalieri (and in turn much of the class) is saying. Human Rights are more than human. However, I see a disconnect between what the theory is, and the logicality of putting it into practice. (Like Communism!)
- One – We live in a large, liberal, Eastern city. It is very easy to look around and say, “People will give animals all the due rights if we show them the way!”
- Go down to Texas, Oklahoma, or even three hours outside of the city. You will be laughed out of the area.
- Go down to Texas, Oklahoma, or even three hours outside of the city. You will be laughed out of the area.
- Two – A majority of the population is moderate....
To give a whole song and dance about animals being treated with human rights is too drastic. - Three – Complete and immediate abolition of slavery didn’t work. Sorry. (See: Sharecropping, Jim Crowe, Grandfather Clauses.)
I like how you're grappling with the particulars of the excerpt from Regan, Alessa. Yes, as Regan notes, being alive is necessary for being a subject-of-a-life, but it is not sufficient, and so there is a moral consideration given to a subject-of-a-life that is not given to what is not a subject-of-a-life. RE tree huggers comment: You may find interesting the essay "Should Trees Have Moral Standing?" I'll try to find it and get it to you and the rest of the class. The essay is an early scholarly consideration of the environment, or living things in the environment, as worthy of legal status. Of course, there is a model for this in the legal status of a corporation qua "person," but legal status for, say, a tree only insofar as it is someone's property.
ReplyDeleteMattresses to Holocaust victims: we'll talk more in class about analogical reasoning, as well as distinctions between reformists (mattresses to Holocaust victims) and abolitionists (abolish the Holocaust), as well as how these and other arguments relate to rights-based versus welfar-based perspectives re NHA.
We'll look closely at Cavalieri, which will be helpful to see whether she's actually arguing that NHA should be "treated with human rights." Her argument has more to do with exploring the implications for NHA of the fact that rights are, themselves, cultural (HA) constructs.
What you say about "complete and immediate abolition of slavery didn't work" is worth looking at, too, vis-a-vis analogical/historical models of reasoning. And we'll visit this in relation to reformist/abolitionist models of HA-NHA relations.
Good stuff, Alessa!